Photo of Kyle Dudek

Kyle Dudek

Subscribe to Kyle Dudek's Posts

Kyle Dudek is an associate in the Tort & Insurance Litigation division. A large part of his practice is dedicated to serving as counsel for state and municipal entities involved in civil rights litigation. Kyle defends government actors against claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and retaliation under the First Amendment. In the private sector, Kyle defends individuals and entities in cases involving employment law, premises liability, professional malpractice, subrogation rights, automobile liability, and wrongful death. In addition, Kyle has experience handling insurance coverage disputes.

Kyle’s practice before joining Henderson Franklin also afforded him extensive time in the courtroom. He served as a law clerk for the Honorable G. Steve Agee in the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Honorable James C. Cacheris in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the Honorable Andrew Baxter in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Kyle also previously worked as an associate for a law firm in Northern Virginia.

Kyle is a member of the Florida, Virginia, and New York Bars. He is admitted to practice before all state courts in Florida, Virginia and New York, as well as the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of New York, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit.

Kyle has been recognized for his professional achievements and was named a “Rising Star" by Florida Super Lawyers magazine in 2018.

Kyle graduated magna cum laude from George Mason University School of Law, where he served on the Articles Committee for the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy. He was also an active member of the business law society, first as the treasurer and then president. While attending Cornell University, Kyle was a teaching assistant and nationally certified peer tutor.

Kyle grew up in Syracuse, New York and relocated to Southwest Florida to join the Henderson Franklin legal team. He currently resides in Fort Myers with his wife, Casey. When not working, Kyle enjoys golfing and walking his dog.

Articles

Contact: Read more about Kyle Dudek

It has long been settled that mistreatment based prohibited characteristics (such as race or sex) is actionable under Title VII even without a tangible employment action – e.g., termination, demotion, or pay cut. These are often referred to as hostile-environment claims. A hostile-environment claim under Title VII requires evidence of mistreatment that is sufficiently severe or persuasive that it can be said to alter the terms or conditions of employment. This measure is meant to draw a dividing line between trivial slights and substantial discrimination.

Nearly a decade ago, the Supreme Court clarified that mistreatment based on retaliation for protected conduct is likewise actionable under Title VII without a tangible employment action. However, the test is different. A retaliatory-hostile-environment claim is actionable when the mistreatment “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).

Accordingly, when dealing with hostile environment caused by retaliation, the court must ask if the mistreatment would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making a claim of discrimination. When confronted with a hostile-environment-claim stemming from race or sex, the court must ask if the mistreatment was sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions employment.…

Continue Reading Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Standard for Retaliation Under Title VII

In 1966, the EEOC began requiring companies with 100 or more employees to compile employment data by race/ethnicity, gender, and job category. Dubbed EEO-1 Reports, these surveys were meant to provide a snapshot of how many racial and ethnic minorities and women were working in a company.

EEO-1 Reports Expanded

During President Obama’s tenure, the EEO-1 Report was broadened into two components. Component 1 would include the same information always collected, while Component 2 would include W-2 wage information for employees by race, ethnicity, and sex. Although designed to target pay discrimination, Component 2 was viewed as overly burdensome. Data compilation would take countless hours, while the human error rate was sure to increase on account of the significantly expanded form.…

Continue Reading Federal Judge Rules that EEOC Must Collect Expanded Data on EEO-1 Forms – Current Deadline September 30, 2019

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on “sex.” Most federal courts have interpreted Title VII to exclude sexual orientation discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit falls into this camp. Since its predecessor’s 1979 decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 937 (5th Cir. 1979), the Eleventh Circuit has steadfastly held to its view that “discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited.” Id. The rationale being that Title VII speaks only of a person’s sex and not sexual orientation. Against this textual backdrop, it is the legislature’s job to extend Title VII if it sees fit. See Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing view that sexual orientation is not a cognizable claim under Title VII.

Circuit Split…

Continue Reading Supreme Court to Settle Dispute on LGBT Bias in the Workplace

A plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim under Title VII must make a preliminary showing that her claims have merit. She can do so in a variety of ways, one of which is by navigating the familiar burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by proving, among other things, that she was treated differently from another “similarly situated” individual. The Eleventh Circuit has long grappled with the question of just how “similarly situated” a plaintiff and her comparators must be – waffling between a standard of  “nearly identical” and “same or similar.”

This confusion came to an end last week in Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., No. 15-11362 (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2019), when the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc held that a plaintiff must demonstrate she and the comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects.” Although the nomenclature is new, the court’s analysis of this standard is a win for employers. As the dissenting judges proclaimed,

[t]oday, the Majority Opinion drops an anvil on the employer’s side of the balance.”

The Facts

…
Continue Reading Eleventh Circuit Clarifies the Test for Comparator Evidence under McDonnell Douglas